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DISPATCH NO. EGFA- 926

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief, FHB  
SUBJECT: GENERAL OPERATIONAL/CALL  
SPECIFIC 0 Contact Report - KIBITZ-150

DATE: 3 March 1953

ATTENTION:

1. A meeting was held by I and E I at the Hotel Schwarzer Schiff in Heidelberg on 26 February 1953 to explain and make certain proposals to him as contained in EGFA-850.

2. He asked first whether there was any further news as to whether the operation should continue, and he was told that if it should it would more than likely be that he would be the key man. He then stated that if that should be, he would have to resign his present position in order to work full time with us. He stated that he would be willing to sign a contract, so long as it did not make him run afoul of his own laws as a German citizen, and would like to have clearance from Bonn to work with the Allies so that he would not be obliged eventually to work with the new German Army. We explained that these matters could be settled later. He evidently realizes that KIBITZ-15 is being moved out of the operation and he is willing to take over his position.

3. In discussing the operation itself, KIBITZ-150 said he thought that twenty-five teams should be sufficient to cover the U.S. Zone of Germany, but thinks that thenceforth we should coordinate our recruiting with the Army's "War Plans", rather than taking just whatever comes along. Believing that the Russians will follow a plan of attack which can be generally calculated, he suggests putting operators in certain key spots along the invasion route which would become active as soon as the Russians came through. His estimates of the number of teams which should be trained is much more conservative than that of KIBITZ-15 and he realizes the difficulties and length of time required to train one W/T operator.

4. We then talked about the need for compartmenting the net, and he agreed that we must make every effort to sever possible existing connections among members of the net. He said whichever people knew one another were not aware that the other was operative in the net. He concurred with our suggestion that KIBITZ-137-237 would have to go since they had no training and knew more people than the others. (See attachment.)

5. He was asked whether after finishing setting up the net if he would consider emigrating to the U.S. with his family, and he said that he would have to give it some thought. He knows he and his family will have to leave Germany in case of war, but was not sure about emigrating permanently. He said "What would I do," and we replied "What would you do here," and he agreed and said it might just be the opportunity for him.

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FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

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**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

**EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)**  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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6. We find KIBITZ-150 very reasonable to work with and quite amenable to our suggestions and directions. He has shown his interest and willingness by working two years for us without salary, and seems now ready to take over the net and work as we direct. He is very intelligent and capable of thinking and acting independently of KIBITZ-15. If, however, he is taken on as chief agent we think that because of his interest and idealistic motivation we will have to work in definite terms and objectives, as he can tell when he is being given the run-around. We shall have to undertake to train, service, and supply the people he furnishes with greater speed and resolution than has been done to date.

APPROVED:

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